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ABSTRACT
The Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (Volume III Part 3) is one of three documents of the
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base
program.
The NSAD summarizes the mission and the credible accidents/events which may lead to
nuclear hazards to the general public. The radiological effects and associated consequences
of the hazards are discussed in detail. The probability of occurrence is combined with the
potential number of individuals exposed to or above guideline values to provide a measure of
accident and total mission risk.
The overall mission risk has been determined to be low with the potential exposure to
or above 25 rem limited to less than 4 individuals per every 1000 missions performed. No
radiological risk to the general public occurs during the prelaunch phase at KSC. The most
significant risks occur from prolonged exposure to reactor debris following land impact
generally associated with the disposal phase of the mission where fission product inventories
can be high.
Safeguards such as positive tracking and location devices or recovery by the Space Shuttle
can further reduce overall risk. The end of mission risk from a destructive excursion or
quasi-steady state operation can be substantially reduced by providing for a permanent
shutdown of the reactor prior to disposal.
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FOREWORD
The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research.
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications.
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those of
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
Table A. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety Documentation
Volume
I
Part 1
Part 2
II
Part 1
Part 1A
III
Part 1
Part 2
Part 2 A
Part 3
IV
Part 1
Part 2
V
Part 1
Part 2
VI
VII
Part 1
Part 2
Executive Summary
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Space Base Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear Safety Analysis (PSAR)
Appendix-Alternate Reactor Data (CRD)
Reactor System Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Reference Design Document (RDD)
Accident Model Document (AMD)
Accident Model Document - Appendix
Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
Space Shuttle Nuclear System Transportation
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Terrestrial Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear System Safety Guidelines
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle/Nuclear Payloads Safety
Space Base Nuclear System Safety Plan
Literature Review
Literature Search and Evaluation
ASRDI Forms
Document No.
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72SD4201-3-2
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72SD4201-4-2
72SD4201-5-1
72SD4201-5-2
72SD4201-6
72SD4201-7-1
72SD4201-7-2*
*Limited distribution
VI
This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
Table B. Study Area Cross Reference
* [T] PRIMARY DISCUSSION
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SECTION!
INTRODUCTION
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System presents a preliminary
but comprehensive assessment of public and ecological safety of the Zirconium Hydride (ZrH)
Brayton cycle reactor electrical power system as applied to a Space Base Program. The
reference power system hereafter referred to as the reactor power module was derived from
the Phase A Space Base studies recently performed for NASA by McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion (MDAC) and North American Rockwell (NAR) (References 1-1 and 1-2).
Results of the analysis have led to the conclusion that the use of a reactor power module in
space operations can present a low risk to the general public. Although specific risk
values are presented, the intent is to provide a reference from which future configuration
changes (affecting failure modes, probabilities, source terms, etc.) can be factored into the
analysis. Therefore, the results of this study can serve as a point of departure for the
nuclear safety analysis of reactor power modules on future manned space missions.
The PSAR is presented in three separate documents as follows:
Volume HI, Part 1 - Reference Design Document (ROD)
Volume III, Part 2 - Accident Model Document (AMD)
Volume III, Part 3 - Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
Figure 1-1 illustrates the basic logic and structure of the PSAR. The Nuclear Safety
Analysis Document (NSAD) is contained in this volume. The NSAD describes the radiological
consequences of credible events/accidents that lead to the release of radioactive materials
or to radiation exposure to the general public and ecological system. The radiological con-
sequences are determined by radiation exposure and risk calculations. The reference mis-
sion is discussed in some detail to emphasize the built-in safeguard design and operational
features and indicate where additional safety considerations can be applied to further reduce
the risk.
1-1
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The HDD and AMD supplement the NSAD. The HDD contains a description of: (1) safety
related systems, subsystems, and components; (2) the mission; and (3) the supporting facili-
ties and operations necessary to accomplish the mission. The AMD serves to identify the
occurrence and probability of events and failures which can lead to public nuclear safety
hazards and establish the radiological source terms characterizing the nuclear hazard.
The NSAD is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the approach
used in the safety analysis leading to the identification of the radiological risk involved in
performing the mission. Summary data of the reference mission and power module is con-
tained in Section 3. The radiological consequences of mission accidents (hazard effects) are
presented in Section 4. This data is combined with accident probabilities and source terms
in Section 5 to provide a determination of the accident and total mission risk to the general
public. Some of the primary data of the safety analysis is presented parametrically in
Section 6 to permit an evaluation of the sensitivity of the results presented in Sections 4 and
5 to changes in conditions and basic assumptions. Mission accident characteristics, source
terms, probabilities and radiological exposure models are contained in the appendices.
As intended, the analysis is only concerned with public rather than crew safety. Crew
safety is addressed in the Space Base PSAR - Volume II, Part 1, 72SD4201-2-1.
REFERENCES
1-1. "Space Base Concept Data"; MDC GO576 prepared under contract NAS 8-25140;
McDonnell Douglas Corporation; June 1970.
1-2. "Space Base Definition"; SD70-160 prepared under contract NAS 9-9953; North
American Rockwell; July 1970.
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SECTION 2
SAFETY ANALYSIS APPROACH
2.1 GENERAL
The fundamental terrestrial nuclear safety objectives in the application of nuclear reactors
to a Space Base Program are (1) the prohibition of any radiation exposure to the general
public during normal mission operations and (2) insurance that the general public will not
be subjected to any significant radiation risk when considering all credible accident conditions.
To conform to these rigid requirements, the following design objectives are necessary:
1. The reactor should be inherently safe when exposed to accident conditions (i. e.,
no criticality accidents from core compaction, control drum rotation, water
moderation or spurious control system malfunction).
2. The reactor operation history prior to launch should be limited to minimize the
fission product inventory in the core at the time of launch.
3. At the completion of the operational phase, the reactor should be safely disposed
of or recovered. A boost to a high long-lived orbit to permit sufficient time for
fission product decay prior to a potential uncontrolled reentry due to orbital decay
and subsequent earth impact is considered the primary disposal mode for the
analysis.
Accidents can occur which may subject the reactor to environments beyond the limitations
of its components and result in potential exposure to the populace. When subjected to certain
accident environments, containment of fission products cannot be assured. Identification of
all accidents and failure modes which could lead to radiation exposures is required to
assess the risk involved in utilizing the reactor for its intended mission. The exposure
modes to the general population from potential accidents are:
1. Direct exposure from reactor prompt radiation and radioactive materials.
2. Internal exposure from inhalation of radioactive materials.
3. Internal exposure from ingestion of radioactive materials.
2-1
2.2 APPROACH
Figure 1-1 illustrates the overall approach followed for the terrestrial safety evaluation.
The "reference mission", presented in the HDD, was subjected to an "Accident Analysis"
to identify all possible launch vehicle and reactor power module failures which may en-
danger the safety of the reactor. Potential failure modes of the reactor power module
which may result in the escape of fission products, radioactive debris, or in radiation
exposure to the general public were identified. Where appropriate, analytical models were
developed to describe the severity of the resulting accident and to determine the response
of the reactor to the imposed failure mode.
The environment into which the fission products are released determines the means by
which the released fission products are dispersed and the overall extent of contamination.
Ground level releases of fission products result in a local distribution of activity, whereas
the fission products which are released to the upper atmosphere are distributed over most
of the Earth's surface at a very low concentration.
The quantity, type and location of fission products which may be released in each accident
are called "Source Terms". These source terms, as well as the source term probabilities,
were determined for all identified accidents and reactor power module failure modes. This
data, presented in the AMD, together with specified release environments were used to
determine (1) the associated "Hazard Effects" (radiological consequences) and (2) the
"Radiological Risk" to the general public. This document is primarily concerned with
these two areas. The general approach taken in these analyses is shown in Figure 2-1
and discussed in the following two subsections.
2. 2.1 HAZARD EFFECT ANALYSIS
The consequences associated with a given accident/event are directly related to the responses
of the reactor power module. These potential responses are identified along with their
relative probability of occurrence on the Abort Sequence Trees presented in Appendix D
of the AMD. Using the source terms developed, calculations are then made of the direct
and indirect doses to the whole body versus distance for each given accident. This dose
2-2
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data, which is very sensitive to weather conditions and release altitude, provides the isopleth
areas associated with each accident. In general, worst case Pasqual F conditions were
assumed (Figure 2-2). The sensitivity to weather is treated parametrically in Section 6.
When combined with potential accident locations (related to population density), the calcula-
tion of the average number of people exposed to a given accident, can be made.
UNSTABLE
(PASQUILLA)
LOOPING
NEUTRAL
(PASQUILLD)
CONING
STABLE
(PASQUILL F)
FANNING
Figure 2-2. Weather Conditions
2. 2. 2 RADIOLOGICAL RISK ANALYSIS
For a realistic radiological risk assessment, it is necessary to consider the probability (P)
and the number of people exposed (N) to the radiation hazards resulting from all potential
accidents during the entire mission.
2.2.2.1 Radiation Dose Criteria
The number of people considered exposed is based on the use of dose "guideline" values
(an individual exposed to a "guideline" dose or above is considered exposed). However,
since the dose guideline is a threshold value, any individual exposed to less than this value
is not considered exposed. The guideline values used (Table 2-1) are the same as those
employed on previous SNAP-10A and SNAP-8 safety evaluations.
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Table 2-1. Dose Guideline Values
Body Organ
Whole Body
Thyroid
Bone (70-year)
Lower Large Intestine
Dose Guideline Values - Rem
25
300
150
75
At these levels there are normally no detectable clinical effects. Although injury may
occur at below the dose guideline values, its probability is quite low (Reference 1).
The whole body and thyroid dose guideline values given in Table 2-1 are derived from
commercial nuclear reactor power plant siting criteria as specified in the Code of Federal
Regulations 10CFR100 (Reference 2). The bone and lower large intestine dose guideline
values are from the Department of Materials and Licensing (DML-Docket 50-268) (Reference
3).
2.2.2.2 Application of the Probabilistic Philosophy
Space nuclear power systems safety analyses have been based on a statistical approach.
In evaluating the nuclear power system for a Space Base Program, it was necessary to
describe as completely as possible the hazards associated with the planned mission and to
estimate the probabilities of their occurrences. The risk associated with each accident
is taken as the product of the number of people exposed (N) to dose guideline values as a
result of a specific accident and the probability of exposure from that accident (P) (Figure
2-2). The mission risk is the summation of these products for all the accidents in the
mission ( = S P x N for all mission accidents).
2.2.2.3 Determination of Risk
The risk to the general public incurred by a release of radioactive material or by an excessive
radiation exposure was assessed through the use of an exposure index calculated for each
potential radiation exposure event. The exposure index is defined as the average number of
2-5
people who may be exposed to the dose guideline values specified m Table 2-1 for each
radiation exposure event in the mission. The objective of this evaluation was to provide the
information required for a risk versus benefit decision for flight approval.
In addition, since all potential accidents are considered, the relative risk of each accident
was designated. The most hazardous/high risk accidents could then be carefully evaluated
to determine additional safeguards to improve system safety.
2.3 REFERENCES
2-1 C.A. Willis, "Radiological Aspects of Reentry Burnup of SNAP Reactors", NAA-SR-
11761, North American Aviation-Atomics International, March 25, 1966.
2-2 "Code of Federal Regulations" 10CFR100, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
2-3 DML-Docket 50-268, Department of Materials and Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission.
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SECTION 3
NOMINAL MISSION
3. 1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (SUMMARY)
The Space Base electrical power is supplied by two independent zirconium hydride (ZrH) nuclear
reactors. A detailed description is provided in Volume III Part 1. Each reactor is rated
at 600 kWt and normally operates at 330 kWt. Three Brayton Power Conversion Systems
(PCS) are coupled to each reactor with one in operation and the remaining two on stand-by.
During normal operation, 50 kW of net electrical power is obtained from one Brayton system.
Nominal lifetime of the reactor is five years while that of each PCS is assumed to be 2. 5
years. The reference zirconium hydride reactor shown in Figure 3-1 is completely sur-
rounded by shielding. The reactor core, 0.29 meters in diameter, contains 295 fuel ele-
ments supported in a triangular pitch array. The fuel elements consist of a uranium zircon-
ium alloy with a composition of 10. 5 weight percent fully enriched uranium. The alloy is
22 3
massively hydrided, 6. 3 x 10 atoms/cm to provide neutron moderation. The fuel ele-
ment cladding, which is a 0.38 mm (0.015 in.) thick nickel alloy tube, protects the fuel
from the NaK coolant and also contains the fission products and hydrogen moderator.
The reactor is controlled by ten control drums which surround the core. Rotation of the
drums varies the amount of neutron reflection into the core and thus provides reactor con-
trol. This is accomplished by utilizing control drums that are composed of a neutron-re-
flective material (BeO) on one side and an absorber material (Ta-lOW) on the other. Drum
rotation is produced by a stepper motor operating through an integral gear set with a 6:1
ratio. In the fully shutdown position, the gear teeth are disengaged by an electrically oper-
ated cam lockout device to prevent drum rotation due to launch acceleration.
A prepoison (Gadolinium-155) is used in the core to reduce the reactivity variation during
the planned lifetime to less than the $ 9. 00 control provided by the control drums. As
nuclear operation proceeds, reactivity losses occur due to uranium burnup, fission product
accumulation, and hydrogen loss from the fuel elements. The prepoison is consumed during
operation and provides reactivity compensation.
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CONTROL DRUM
ACTUATOR
BEARING
FUEL ELEMENT
BeO-POISON
CONTROL DRUM
VESSEL DIMENSIONS
HEIGHT 0744 METER (293 IN.)
DIAMETER O.SS9METER<22X> IN.)
REACTOR
OUTLET PIPE
TYPICAL
Figure 3-1. Reference Zirconium Hydride Reactor
The reactor power modules are assumed to be launched from Complex 39 at Kennedy Space
Center. An Interim-21 launch vehicle will boost the reactor power systems to rendezvous with
the Space Base that has been previously launched into a 500 km (273 nm) earth orbit. Space
tugs will withdraw the reactor power modules from the payload shroud, and dock them to
the Space Base. Each reactor will be brought to power (330 kWt) to provide the required
100 kWe to the Space Base. At the completion of five years operation or at the end of life-
time, each ractor wiU be shutdown, separated from the Space Base, and inserted into a
990 km (535 nm) circular orbit with the disposal propulsion system. The high orbit dis-
posal permits essentially complete decay of the fission product inventory prior to eventual
earth impact. The disposal orbit decay life is over 1100 years.
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3.2 MISSION PHASES
A brief description of the four mission phases (Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, Orbital Opera-
tions, and End of Mission Reactor Disposal) is presented below.
3.2.1 PRELAUNCH - PHASE I
The Prelaunch Phase includes the following activities:
1. Transportation
2. Receipt, inspection and storage
3. Prelaunch checkout and assembly
4. Launch vehicle/payload integration and test
5. Launch complex/range integration and test
6. Countdown
3.2,1.1 Transportation
The transportation of the reactor power module to KSC will be accomplished in such a manner
that the power module is nearly in a completely assembled configuration. Separable sections
of the radiator and shield are permitted if liquid metal lines are not broken. The power mod-
ule will be shipped in an environmentally controlled shipping container "transporter" which
provides the proper monitoring equipment. Prior reactor operation at the manufacturing
facility shall be limited to low power critical testing to minimize the buildup of a core fission
product inventory.
The power module within its transporter, will be off-loaded from the transport vehicle which
may be a plane, railcar or barge, and transported to the Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB)
for receipt inspection.
Three reactor power modules will be delivered to KSC, two for the launch and one as a back-
up. The delivery schedule for the three reactors is ninety days, sixty days and forty-five
days prior to launch.
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3.2.1.2 Receipt. Inspection and Storage
The transporter and power module will receive a comprehensive receiving inspection for
proper configuration, visual damage, and monitoring of instruments designed to record shock
loads and environmental conditions such as humidity, air chemical composition and radiation.
A detailed inspection is made for visual damage, fluid leaks, system integrity and electrical
harness and umbilical connections. Provisions must be made for the discharging and purg-
ing of the liquid metal systems such that if a leak were detected, the system can be properly
prepared for safe shipment back to the manufacturing facility. Reactor control safety devices
are checked.
Provision for storage of three power modules shall be required for storage times of at least
one year. During the operational mission, a minimum of two replacement power modules are
stored in a ready condition.
3.2.1.3 Prelaunch Checkout and Assembly
Prelaunch checkout takes place prior to booster integration or placement into storage and
consists of a series of subsystem verification tests to assure the integrity and functional
operation of the power module. Pressure and leak tests will be made and the power module
coolant system will be operated to verify functioning of the PCS, valves, EM pumps, and
fluid lines. Electrical connections and harnesses will receive continuity tests. Each
reactor control drum shall be checked to verify operation and response characteristics.
Mechanical interlocks and detailed procedures are used to eliminate the possibility of start-
up. No criticality tests are made at KSC (limited reactor power operation at manufacturer's
facility is permitted).
Power module systems tests will be performed where booster and spacecraft interface
electrical signals can be sent, received and sequenced for prelaunch and in-flight operation
simulation. Electrical and mechanical interfaces with the launch vehicles and spacecraft
will be checked to ensure compatibility. Booster interface rings and shrouds are used
in checking mechanical interface conformance. A complete radiological protection plan
will be used to enforce nuclear safety regulations. Following prelaunch testing, the power
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module will be prepared for transportation to the VAB or Mobile Launcher (ML) for integra-
tion with the launch vehicle. This operation includes the addition of the reactor/radiator
shrouds and the installation of all special instruments and safing of all ordnance devices.
3.2.1.4 Launch Vehicle/Pay load Integration
Launch vehicle integration tests may be performed in the VAB or at Launch Complex 39.
In either case, the power module should be scheduled as late in the sequence as possible.
Launch vehicle integration consists of hardware mating and interface and combined systems
tests required to acquire launch readiness. Countdown demonstrations are performed and
certain post-launch conditions are simulated such as power module separation, umbilical
disconnect and instrumentation for power transfers.
Limited loading checks with the booster and the handling devices will be performed utilizing
a dummy payload. Mechanical and electrical interfaces are simulated. A simulated system
launch readiness and countdown test is performed in the above configuration to insure com-
patibility of instrumentation, environmental and support systems. A continuous and com-
prehensive systems status check and flight readiness test is performed prior to the actual
ignition sequences and liftoff.
3.2.1.5 Launch Complex/Range Integration
The launch vehicle complete with reactor power module(s) installed is moved to Launch
Complex 39 via the ML crawler/transporter at T-8 days (Considerably less launch pad
time is assumed compared to that employed on Apollo launches). At all times the shroud
is maintained in position around the power module(s). Power module instrumentation
monitored includes umbilical and separation circuit connections, radioactivity, environ-
mental conditions and control circuit continuities. Telemetry and range verification tests
are conducted. A simulated countdown, propellant loading and pressure tests are made.
3.2.1.6 Countdown
The countdown is initiated at T-2 days where flight readiness and functional systems tests
are performed on major subsystems of the INT-21. Ordnance is installed prior to launch
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vehicle cryogenic loading, At this point, launch pad accessibility is greatly restricted.
Throughout the final phases of the countdown, continuous monitoring is provided. At T-l
hour, the terminal countdown is initiated after the completion of all flight readiness checks
and propellant loading sequences. At T-187 seconds,an automatic sequence is initiated
for the start of the engines. Swing arms are around the vehicle until the automatic sequence
is initiated. Termination of this phase is at liftoff which occurs at T + 9 seconds.
3.2.2 LAUNCH/ASCENT - PHASE 2
The INT-21 launch vehicle will be used to boost the reactor power module(s) to orbit from
Launch Complex 39 at KSC. One or two complete reactor power modules will be launched
on one INT-21. The power module requires insertion into a 500 km (273 run) orbit inclined
55 degrees to the earth's equatorial plane for rendezvous with the Space Base. The flight
azimuth through the atmosphere of this orbit is 46 degrees, measured east of north, as a
result of current range safety requirements at the Eastern Test Range (ETR). Since the
ETR flight azimuth restriction is not compatible with the desired orbit inclination, a plane
change is performed during the boost to orbit. The plane change maneuver to establish the
desired orbit is performed during the portion of flight where Inertial Guidance Mode (IGM)
is providing launch vehicle steering commands.
The launch trajectory traverses over Eurasia prior to orbital insertion. The trajectory
passes over France, Switzerland, Italy, Albania, Greece, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
3.2.3 ORBITAL OPERATIONS - PHASE 3
The orbital operations phase begins following successful docking of the two reactor power
modules to the Space Base. Docking will be followed by an EVA to make the electrical and
control circuit connections at the boom interface. After the reactor power modules have
been checked out and cleared for startup, the power module booms are extended into the
normal operating position.
The expected automatic startup sequence is initiated from the Space Base control room. A
controlled speed stepping sequence individually single steps the drums in order as planned
3-6
into the startup program; the stepping speed is reduced as criticality approaches. The
reactor is brought slowly through criticality and up to operating temperature and power. It
is assumed that each reactor operates continuously at 330 kWt for the duration of its five-
year mission.
3.2.4 END OF MISSION/REACTOR DISPOSAL - PHASE 4
At the completion of the normal lifetime of the reactor, or after any accident which perma-
nently damages the reactor or power conversion system, the reactor will be boosted to a
990 km (535 run) disposal orbit altitude where the fission product inventories will be allowed
to decay to acceptable levels prior to eventual reentry which is expected to occur after a
calculated 1167 years. After reactor shutdown the sequence of events required for checkout,
separation, aid orbital transfer with the disposal system are:
1. Preparation Sequence for Reactor Disposal
Stabilize temperature (heaters on)
Guidance and control checkout
Gyro checkout
Sensor checkout
Separate (spring release to provide a AV of ~ 0.4 m/sec)
2. Post Separation Alignment
Stabilize attitude for alignment
Acquire horizon with sensors
Scan for, and acquire sun
Uncage gyros
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3. Orbit Transfer
Stabilize attitude for transfer initiation
Yaw maneuver
Spin about roll axis
Ignite first two rockets
Despin and stabilize
Gyro attitude reference alignment
Attitude maneuver for circularization burn
Spin about roll axis
Ignite second two rockets.
The 1167 year orbital lifetime is determined from the power module ballistic coefficient.
This disposal orbit lifetime can be increased to approximately 10, 000 years by separation
of the reactor and its shield to increase the ballistic coefficient. The study does not con-
sider reactor separation a part of the reference mission. However, the significantly in-
creased orbital lifetimes achievable by a separation of the reactor/shield from the remainder
of the power module provides terrestrial nuclear safety advantages.
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SECTION 4
RADIOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF MISSION ACCIDENTS
(HAZARDS EFFECT ANALYSIS)
The safety analysis approach discussed in Section 2 has been used in determining the radio-
logical consequences and associated risk to the general public of each accident, for each
mission phase and for the entire mission. This section addresses the consequences (potential
doses to whole body and various organs) of the accidents and identifies those with the highest
probability of occurence.
4.1 SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS AND SOURCE TERMS
A complete description of the mission accidents, failure modes, probability of occurrence,
and radiological source terms are presented in the AMD, Volume IE, Part 2. The charac-
teristics of the mission accidents (accident description, causes, probability, consequences
and hazard location) developed in the AMD and their corresponding risk values as deter-
mined in Section 5, are summarized in Appendix B of this document.
Fission product inventories, amounts released and radiation levels from the reactor/fuel
elements for each accident case are presented in Table 4-1. Reference should be made to
Section 5 of the AMD for the associated source term probabilities.
4.2 RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE MODES
The radiological exposure modes to the general public from potential accidents are direct
external exposure from reactor prompt radiation and radioactive materials and internal
exposure from inhalation and ingestion of radioactive material. The consequences resulting
from a reactor accident are directly related to the type and extent of exposure mode pre-
sented. Potential exposure modes for the ZrH reactor power module are summarized in
Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2. Potential Exposure Modes
EXPOSURE MODE HAZARD SOURCE POSSIBLE CAUSES (ACCIDENTS)
E
X
T
E
R
N
A
L
DIRECT
INTACT
REACTOR
PROMPT RADIATION FROM INTACT REACTOR
GAMMA RADIATION FROM INTACT REACTOR
INADVERTENT REACTOR EXCURSION
QUASI-STEADY STATE CRITICAL
FISSION PRODUCT DECAY
ACTIVATED MATERIALS
DISASSEMBLED
REACTOR
AIRBORNE ACTIVATED MATERIALS
AIRBORNE FISSION PRODUCTS (CLOUD)
GROUND DEPOSITED FISSION PRODUCTS
ACTIVATED STRUCTURAL DEBRIS
SCATTERED FUEL ELEMENTS
DESTRUCTIVE REACTOR EXCURSION
IMPACT
Fl REBALL AND EXPLOS ION AT LAUNCH
ORBITAL COLLISION AND EXPLOSION
INGESTION GROUND DEPOSITED FISSION PRODUCTS
FISSION PRODUCTS IN DRINKING WATER
ACTIVATED MATERIALS IN DRINKING WATER
FISSION PRODUCTS IN MARINE LIFE WATER
ACTIVATED MATERIALS IN MARINE LIFE WATER
GROUND DEPOSITED ACTIVATED MATERIALS
DESTRUCTIVE REACTOR EXCURSION
GROUND OR WATER IMPACT
REENTRY ABLATION OF INDIVIDUAL FUEL ELEMENTS
EXCESSIVE REENTRY HEATING AND BURNUP
WATER IMPACT OF FUEL ELEMENTS
FIREBALL AND EXPLOS ION AT LAUNCH
ORB ITAL COLLIS ION AND EXPLOS ION
INHALATION AIRBORNE ACTIVATED MATERIALS
AIRBORNE GASEOUS FISSION PRODUCTS
AIRBORNE PARTICULATE FISSION PRODUCTS
DESTRUCTIVE REACTOR EXCURSION
IMPACT AND REACTOR DISASSEMBLY
EXCESSIVE REENTRY HEATING AND BURNUP
REENTRY ABLATION OF INDIVIDUAL FUEL ELEMENTS
FIREBALL AND EXPLOSION AT LAUNCH
ORB ITAL COLLISION AND EXPLOSION
4.2. 1 DIRECT EXTERNAL EXPOSURE
Accidental reactor criticality presents several radiological hazards. The dominant consider-
ation for steady state operation and for near proximity to an excursion is the prompt radiation
field. This direct external radiation exposure results in neutron and gamma exposure
to the whole body.
Radioactive material direct exposure also results in a whole body exposure. A reactor dis-
assembly on land impact due to high velocity impact loads, or by a destructive excursion can
result in the dispersal of reactor debris and fuel elements at the impact location which can
present a direct whole body exposure hazard to the general public. Distributed fuel elements
are assumed to be spread evenly over a 50 meter radius. Another direct whole body exposure
source may come from a fission product cloud release from a reactor disassembly. An in-
dividual located downwind of the release will receive a whole body direct external exposure
as the fission product cloud passes by.
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4.2.2 INTERNAL EXPOSURE
The release of fission products to the atmosphere and the downwind dispersion by the pre-
vailing meteorological conditions may result in an inhalation exposure. Fission products
deposited in the lungs are absorbed into the body and accumulate in the critical organs.
Fallout of fission products from a cloud results in a ground deposited activity which may
contaminate vegetation and potable water and consequently may result in an ingestion expo-
sure to the populace and ecology.
In the event that fission products are released to pasture land, the ground deposited activity
may be quickly metabolized into the milk of dairy cows. Consumption of the contaminated
milk by an individual will result in a thyroid exposure from the radioiodines and a bone ex-
posure by strontium-90.
Since approximately one-half percent of the land area in the United States is occupied by
reservoirs, the possibility exists where a reactor may impact into a reservoir and con-
taminate the drinking water. The release of activity may result from a high velocity im-
pact disassembly or from a destructive excursion. The potential exposure from the con-
sumption of contaminated drinking water as well as contaminated milk can be minimized
by providing a tracking capability so that the reactor impact location can be quickly identi-
fied. The area can then be surveyed by a properly equipped recovery team to determine the
extent of contamination and to quarantine all water or milk which would result in unacceptable
radiation exposures to the general public.
Although present estimates would indicate no radiological problem exists from radioactive
material released to the ocean, it is difficult to be certain that some small amount of marine
life may not be contaminated. However, the probability of catching the marine life for
human consumption is remote, except in shallow coastal waters and the continental shelf.
High altitude dispersal of fission products would cause only a slight increase in the diffuse
radioactive burden of the atmosphere as a whole. However, this slight increase is applicable
to most of the world's population, with biological effects (both somatic and genetic) that may
be indeterminate and difficult to distinguish statistically from natural background levels.
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4.3 ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES
A discussion of the radiological consequences resulting from the key accidents in each
mission phase is presented in the following subsections.
4.3.1 PRELAUNCH
The Prelaunch Phase begins with the installation of the ZrH reactor power modules atop the
INT-21 in the VAB and terminates at ignition of the S-IC booster engines. The total phase
—3
abort probability is 7 x 10 . Prelaunch Phase aborts which can result in a fission product
release or a radiation hazard are:
1. Reactor dropped while being mated to launch vehicle
2. Tip over of the reactor/launch vehicle during transport to the launch pad
3. Explosion and fire on the launch pad during launch vehicle fueling
(reactor falls back on launch pad)
4. Liquid metal fire.
The potentially hazardous consequences arising from these accidents in order of declining
probability are:
_g
1. Radiation shield damaged 1. 5 x 10
-52. Fuel cladding breached, primary system ruptured 5 x 10
—53. Quasi-steady state critical operation 2 x 1 0
4. Nondestructive reactor excursion 1 x 10
••fi
5. Reactor disassembly 6 .6x10
-66. Destructive reactor excursion 3. 4 x 10
The most serious accident consequence which is remotely possible during the Prelaunch
Phase is a destructive excursion at Launch Complex 39. A destructive excursion may occur
by a rapid insertion of reactivity by control drum motion on land impact or by over moder-
ation following water immersion.
4-7
The degree of hazard associated with a destructive excursion is not only dependent upon the
magnitude of the excursion but also on the residual fission product inventory in the core
which is generated during preflight cnticality testing. A study was conducted to determine
the consequences of a launch complex destructive excursion with a reactor that has experienced
a limited preflight operating history. The power histories considered are shown in Table
4-3.
Table 4-3. Preflight Operational History Study
Power Level
Watts
10.0
1.0
4.0
0.1
100.0
Operating Time
Hours
2.4
24.0
24.0
24.0
288.0
Watts -hours
24.0
24.0
96.0
2.4
28,800.0
The flight SNAP-10A reactor experienced 16 watt-hours of preflight operating history. The
total body dose for all cases is shown in Figure 4-1 for zero shutdown time followed by a
destructive excursion. Normally there will be a several week shutdown period prior to ship-
ment from the manufacturer's facility to the launch complex. Since a substantial fraction of
the fission product activity generated during the preflight operation is short-lived, a major
portion of inventory will have decayed before it could possibly become involved in an accident.
The total dose from 100-watt operation for 12 days followed by 60 days shutdown is shown
in Figure 4-2 and is compared to a 100 MW-sec destructive excursion of a reactor core with
no previous operating history. It can be seen m Figure 4-2 that the residual fission product
activity 60 days after 100-watt operation for 288 hours is small compared to the fission pro-
ducts generated by the 100 MW-sec excursion. Therefore, it appears that limited preflight
reactor operation followed by a 60-day shutdown will not significantly increase the hazard
should a destructive excursion occur.
4-8
The total body dose shown in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 is a summation of the external exposure
from immersion in a fission product cloud and internal exposure to the whole body from
inhalation. In addition to the total body exposure, other types of exposure that occur at
the same time are:
1. Inhalation exposure to other body organs
2. Whole body prompt radiation exposure.
The inhalation, cloud, and prompt neutron and gamma doses are shown in Figure 4-3 as a
function of distance from the reactor. Pasquill F weather conditions were again considered
in this calculation for conservatism.
The locus of downwind isopleth centerline distances for total body dose equivalent to natural
background is shown in Figure 4-4 for an accident occurring at Launch Complex 39 at KSC.
The total body dose in this case includes prompt neutron and gamma in addition to that from
cloud immersion and inhalation exposures to the whole body.
In the event of an accident at KSC, radiation exposure to the ground crew will be minimized
since they will be situated at a safe distance (greater than 5 km from the launch pad). As
seen in Figure 4-4, the total body dose from the accident is equivalent to the yearly natural
background level at about 4 km from Launch Complex 39. Following an accident, access to
the radiation zone in the vicinity of the reactor debris will be restricted by the recovery
crew.
For an accident involving water impact, a nondestructive excursion may occur which
would result in the doses shown in Figure 4-5. It was assumed that a quasi-steady state
power level of one kW thermal may possibly occur. The dose rates shown are for an un-
shielded configuration for conservatism. The dose for one hour is less than the yearly
background level of 150 mrem at less than 300 meters from the reactor. Recovery person-
nel will cordon off the area to minimize radiation exposure until the reactor can be shutdown
and removed from the area. Chemical poisons may be added to the water, the reactor re-
moved or the water may be drained from the pool to effect shutdown of the reactor should the
reactor fail to shutdown by itself. The limited heat rejection capability is expected to cause
fuel element failure and subsequent shutdown.
4-9
I
 I
 I
 I
w
aH-iscxi
 NVDHO
Oom§
 *
I
 *
W
 
Wo
.
 
C
D
CO
 
CO
I-3)
- 1
 
o
 c
•
*
•
*
 
"m
 
O
o
 8
 Srt
CO
W
3U
 
-
 39OO
 AOO
a
 T
vxo
x
rt
 
xl
03
 
5
O
 
Q
)
QQ
 
(U
rf
 
5H
OH
<u
 
.2
"
 a
rH
-
 
.8
OJH
 
-a
a-sCO
W
3U
 
-
 39OQ
 AOOS
 TV
1O
1
4-10
CO
A
EPT
 OF
 INTERIOR
.
 
W
ILD
LIFE
 REFUSE
BY
 
PERM
IT
16,990
 ACRES
OVERHEAD
 fM
W 1( 46CO2OtoZ3_JgOO
•R/srveL
!»
f^f^
ik£
O<cCOVLUCOOQ>
-
OOCQ_j
<Bi—•
_c
M
il
\0COv:2ii—
i
 
s
ff
'V
SELL
 ^
 tt
 T
 C
S
EASEM
ENT
 
~
,
H
i
 ACRES
 ^
^
^
Jn
QLU1 —OLUU
_
LJ
_
<
1
—
 1
<
Q
Z
Ou
_
cCT«^±^£ i
 —
o<Q
_
>
 
>
-
 c
o
 
r--^
^
 a
:
Q
 
<
 
^
2
 S
 ^
_»
_
 
—
 -»
 
"-^
13
 2
 
—
O
 Z
D
 ^
o
:
 o
 
—
o
 
c
o
 c
o
•
cS$del<
<
:
CO<co;IDLU
J
l
KSC
h-«M
STVflll
^
u
o
**»11
^o-Jo^ r
f^^
.
01bDnJ0,20)WOffloE-i!H«s0)O003a0IQo>
B)
4-11
4.3.2 LAUNCH/ASCENT
One or two complete reactor power module(s) will be launched with an INT-21 launch vehicle
from Complex 39 at KSC. The reactor power module requires insertion into a 500 km (273
nm) orbit inclined 55 degrees to the earth's equatorial plane for rendezvous with the Space
Base. This phase is initiated at S-IC booster ignition and is terminated at rendezvous
-2
and docking with the Space Base. The total phase abort probability is 6. 8 x 10 . The
accidents which may occur during the Launch/Ascent phase which may possibly lead to
a fission produce release or a radiation hazard are:
1. Launch pad abort, explosion and fire
2. Abort, explosion and fire at altitude
3. Abort, no explosion and fire at altitude
4. Accidental collision while attempting to dock
5. Failure to dock with Space Base
6. Failure to remove thermal shroud
7. Failure to rendezvous with Space Base.
The possible consequences from these accidents in order of declining probability of occur-
rence are:
_2
1. Deep ocean reactor impact 4 x 1 0
2. Power module left in low earth orbit 9.4 x 10
3. Reactor impact at KSC 6. 5 x 10
_g
4. Reactor impact on U.S. Continental Shelf 4. 9 x 10
5. Reactor impact in Eurasia 3.2 x 10~
-46. Launch pad abort 2.2 x 10
—57. Reactor disassembly at altitude 3.7x10
4-12
4.3.2.1 Land Impact Followed by Destructive Excursion
During launch, land impact may occur on KSC or in Eurasia along the trajectory which
passes over France, Switzerland, Italy, Albania, Greece, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
An unlikely possibility exists (2.6 x 10 ) that a destructive excursion may occur upon land
impact by a rapid insertion of reactivity caused by a combination of control drum motion and
core compaction, or by over moderation from water immersion. The energy release from
the destructive excursion again is assumed to be 100 MW-sec. The inhalation, cloud and
prompt neutron and gamma doses are shown in Figure 4-3 for Pasquill F weather conditions
as a function of distance from the reactor.
The downwind distance for total body dose equivalent to natural background (150 mrem/yr)
is approximately 4 km. This is the immediate exposure to which the dose from the re-
actor debris must be added for a prolonged exposure.
4.3.2.2 Land Impact Followed by Disassembly
High velocity impact can also result in a disassembly without a destructive excursion
_g(2.3x10 ). However, it is conservatively assumed that the fractional release of fission
products is the same for both the destructive excursion and for reactor disassembly resulting
from high velocity impact. The relative probability of reactor disassembly without an excur-
sion is about a factor of 100 greater than that resulting from a destructive excursion. The
one year integrated dose for a high velocity land impact disassembly of the reactor is shown
in Figure 4-6 as a function of distance away from the reactor. The very small reactor core
fission product activity is for 100 watts preflight operation for 288 hours followed by a 60-day
shutdown period prior to launch.
The model used for the disassembled reactor was based on the SNAPTRAN destructive test
data (Reference 4-1). It was assumed that the fuel elements and fuel particles were dis-
tributed uniformly on the ground within a 50 meter radius from the impact point. The dose
rate at a plane one meter above the ground is shown in Paragraph 4.4.3.4 of the AMD
(Volume III, Part 2) as a function of time after shutdown. These dose rates were integrated
over a one year period to yield the integrated dose from distributed fuel for the two orbital
decay cases shown in Figure 4-6. The one day and five year cases are considered possible
events in the launch/ascent phase.
4-13
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4.3.2.3 Reentry Burnup Followed by High Altitude Release
The reactor may not survive reentry. As a consequence, fission products and other radio-
active debris may be released to the upper atmosphere where it will be widely dispersed.
Most of the activity will burnup into fine particles which will fallout predominately in the
hemisphere where the accident has occurred. The dose from this exposure mode will be
extremely low but a large fraction of the general public will be exposed. For the one day
orbital decay case with 100-Watt/288-hour/60-day shutdown preflight operational history,
90 131the maximum inhalation dose at sea level from a stratospheric release of Sr and I
—12 —15
would be about 4 x 10 and 9 x 10 rem, respectively.
4. 3. 3 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
In the baseline mission each of the two reactors will be operated at a power level of 330 kWt
for a period of five years. Although an accident may occur within this five-year operational
period, it is conservatively assumed that five years at 300 kWt power level is the initial con-
dition for all aborts which may occur after the reactor is initially taken to power. This
assumption will result in the maximum fission product and activated material inventory in
the reactor.
—2The Orbital Operations Phase abort probability is 5 x 10 and the accidents which may lead
to a fission product release or a radiation hazard are:
1. Equipment failure aboard Space Base necessitating early abandonment
2. Accidental collision or explosion in orbit
3. Reactor control system malfunction or reactor operational procedure error
4. Loss of critical electrical power system component.
The possible consequences from the above accidents in order of declining probability of
occurrence are:
4-15
-41. Reactor impacts in deep ocean area 8.1 x 10
-42. Reactor impacts on land 3.1 x 10
-43. Destructive reactor excursion in orbit 2.2 x 10
-44. Reactor fails during reentry, fuel elements 1.7 x 10
released from core
5. Reactor impacts shallow water 3. 5 x 10
6. Reactor disassembly in orbit 2.2 x 10
-77. Reactor impacts in reservoir 3.1 x 10
4. 3. 3.1 Land Impact Followed by Disassembly
Land impact may occur randomly between 55 degrees N to 55 degrees S latitudes. Upon land
impact, a reactor disassembly may occur due to high impact velocities. The orbital decay
times calculated for the accidents which may terminate in a land impact disassembly are 3. 5,
5 and 44 years during the orbital operations phase. Consequently, the radiation exposures
will differ for the accidents because of the various fission product decay times. The one year
integrated dose from distributed fuel for high velocity impact disassembly is shown in
Figure 4-7.
4.3.3.2 Land Impact Followed by Destructive Excursion
A destructive excursion can also occur on land impact by a rapid insertion of reactivity by
a combination of control drum rotation and core compaction, or by overmoderation by water
immersion. A 100 MW-sec energy release is assumed to result from the destructive excur-
sion. The one year integrated dose for distributed fuel from a destructive excursion on land
is shown in Figure 4-8 for the orbital decay times that are possible in the phase.
The whole body dose from immersion in a fission product cloud is shown in Figure 4-9 for a
reactor high velocity impact disassembly with no excursion as well as for a destructive ex-
cursion. In both cases the fission product release fractions were assumed to be equivalent.
90The Sr inhalation dose to the bone for these cases is shown in Figure 4-10.
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4.3.3.3 Accidents in Orbit
Some of the orbital operation accidents result in fuel element rupture and the subsequent
release of gaseous and volatile fission products into the primary coolant. A loss of hydrogen
moderator will also occur which will permanently shutdown the reactor preventing an ex-
cursion on land impact. Ruptured fuel elements may be the consequence of an accident in-
volving the tearing away of the power module from the Space Base. The primary heat re-
jection system will be lost and thus, the reactor temperatures may increase (~ 1100 to 1300 K)
to cause fuel cladding rupture due to excessive hydrogen pressures generated. Another acci-
dent which can cause fuel cladding rupture involves a collision or explosion which ruptures
the primary coolant piping. The loss of coolant in the core region may then cause excessive
temperatures which are beyond the containment capability of the fuel elements.
For the case where fission products are released to the primary coolant, this activity will
be released to the upper atmosphere when the reentry aerothermal forces cause rupture of
the primary coolant system. This activity will, therefore, not be available for release upon
land impact of the reactor.
4.3.4 REACTOR DISPOSAL
At the completion of the normal lifetime of the reactor (5 years operation at 330 kWt), or
after any accident which permanently damages the reactor or power conversion system, the
reactor will be boosted to a 990 km (535 nm) disposal altitude where the fission product in-
ventory will decay to an acceptable safe level prior to eventual reentry. The Reactor Dis-
—2posal Phase abort probability is 1. 35 x 10 and the major accidents which may lead to a
radiation hazard to the general public include:
1. Guidance and control failure
2. Failure to separate power module from Space Base
3. Failure of the primary propulsion system
4. Accidental collision with Space Base or related system
5. Misaligned thrust vector
4-19
Because of the various modes of failure during the disposal orbit insertion sequence, several
different orbital lifetimes are possible which may range from one day to 377 years. A suc-
cessful 990 km (535 nm) disposal orbit has a calculated lifetime of 1167 years.
4.3.4.1 Direct External Exposure from Reactor Disassembly and Excursions on Land
Upon earth impact, disassembly of the reactor is assumed to take place by high velocity im-
pact loads or by a destructive excursion. The resulting radioactive debris on the ground will
be the greatest hazard to the general public since it is possible that the exposure could last
a long time before discovery of the accident location. The one year integrated doses are
shown in Figures 4-11 and 4-12 for the various orbital decay times as a function of distance
from the reactor for the case of disassembly without excursion. For the destructive excur-
sion case,the one-year integrated doses are shown in Figures 4-13 and 4-14. The variation
of the one-year integrated dose as a function of orbit lifetime (reactor shutdown time) is shown
in Figures 4-15 and 4-16 at 100 and 1000 meters from the accident location for the no excur-
sion disassembly case and the destructive excursion disassembly case, respectively.
To obtain an indication of the integrated whole body dose for a shorter exposure period than
one year, an estimate was made for a 30-day exposure. For the one-day orbital decay case,
2
the 30-day integrated dose is 2.1 x 10 rem at 100 meters which is about one-third lower
than that for the one-year value. For 3. 5 year and greater orbital decay times, the 30-day
integrated dose is about one-tenth of the one-year value.
4.3.4.2 Internal Exposure from Reactor Disassembly and Excursions on Land
The release of fission products in a high velocity impact disassembly or a destructive ex-
cursion due to control drum rotation/core compaction on land impact may result in an inhala-
131tion exposure to anyone downwind of the release. Figure 4-17 indicates the I thyroid dose
131for Pasquill F weather conditions. The one-day orbital decay I dose for a high velocity
131impact disassembly and for a destructive excursion are equivalent since the I inventory in
the core is not significantly increased by the excursion. It is assumed that both types of dis-
assemblies release 100 percent of the radioiodines. Fora 3. 5-year orbital decay or greater,
131 131there is essentially no I inventory in the core prior to impact. Thus, the I thyroid dose
131for 3. 5 years or greater orbital decay is entirely due to the release of I that is generated
during the excursion.
4-20
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90The Sr bone dose from inhalation during passage of a fission product cloud is presented in
Figures 4-18 and 4-19 for a high velocity impact disassembly and for a destructive excursion,
respectively. These results are again for Pasquill F weather conditions for the orbital de-
90
cay cases possible in the reactor disposal phase of the mission. The Sr inhalation doses
for the two cases are slightly higher for the destructive excursion than for the impact dis-
90
assembly up to the 21-year orbital decay accident, since the Sr generated by the excursion
is less than 10 percent of the reactor core inventory for five years operation at 330 kWt.
For orbital decays greater than 21 years, the contribution from the destructive excursion
90becomes progressively greater. As the pre-impact Sr inventory decays, the excursion
90produced Sr becomes more significant.
4.3.4.3 Total Exposure from Destructive Excursion on Land (Worst Case)
The following types of exposures are shown in Figure 4-20 for a destructive excursion on
land following a one-day orbital decay:
1311. I thyroid inhalation exposure
902. Sr bone inhalation exposure
3. One year integrated whole body exposure from distributed fuel
4. Whole body exposure from immersion in fission product cloud
5. Whole body exposure from prompt neutrons and gammas.
The dose guideline values are indicated for the corresponding exposure modes. For this one-
day orbital decay case, which results in the highest exposures, no guideline values are ex-
ceeded beyond 2500 meters down-wind of the accident. As a comparison, the exposures re-
sulting from a destructive excursion following a 3. 5-year orbital decay are presented in
Figure 4-21. During the 3. 5-year orbital decay, the shorter lived fission products in the
131
reactor core have decayed substantially. Thus, the I thyroid, one-year integrated, and
fission product cloud doses are reduced markedly over those calculated for the one-day
90
orbital decay case. Only the long-lived Sr bone dose and the prompt gamma and neutror
levels are essentially unchanged.
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4.3.4.4 Exposure Due to Reactor Excursion/Disassembly in Reservoir
Another potential accident considered is a reactor disassembly in a reservoir due to a high
velocity water immersion destructive excursion. The most severe accident would be follow-
ing a one-day orbital decay of a reactor that had operated at 330 kWt for five years. At this
3 131 2 90time, the release of 7.95 x 10 curies I and 1. 02 x 10 curies Sr would be considered
maximum for the phase as well as for the mission. In comparison, the 100 MW-sec excur-
131 90
sion generated I and Sr are insignificant. Assuming an instantaneous release with com-
131 90plete mixing to the reservoir volume, the I thyroid and Sr bone dose from the ingestion
of the contaminated water is shown in Figure 4-22, for either an impact disassembly or a
destructive excursion after a one-<lay orbital decay of the shutdown reactor. The fission pro-
duct release fractions are assumed to be the same for both assembly cases. For a destruc-
tive excursion following a 377-year orbital decay time, the water ingestion doses would be
about three orders of magnitude lower than those indicated in Figure 4-22.
Tritium can also be released to the potable water supply by disassembly of the reactor shield
on impact. The tritium is generated by neutron interaction with the LiH shielding material:
U6 + .n1 - ..H3 + .He4 (alpha particle)
o 0 1 &
4
For the most severe accident where 100 percent of the tritium (3 x 10 curies) is released
to the reservoir following a one-day orbital decay of a reactor which has operated at 330 kWt
for five years, the tritium whole body dose from the consumption of the contaminated water
is shown in Figure 4-22.
As indicated in the figures, only reservoirs with relatively small volumes provide concentra-
tions high enough to exceed the dose guideline values. Guideline values would not be exceeded
in a large majority of the reservoirs used for potable water supplies. Early detection and
isolation would reduce the exposure even further.
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4.3.4.5 Exposure Due to Reactor Impact on or Near Pasture Land
Another remote possibility is a reactor impact upwind of pasture land. A release of fission
products may contaminate herbage downwind of the accident site and a dairy herd grazing
131 90
on this land will produce milk contaminated with I and Sr . Within a day or two this
contaminated milk can be consumed by the general public. If the reactor accident is
promptly located, the exposure can be minimized. As in the water reservoir accident,
the most severe case would be a one-day orbital decay followed by a high velocity impact
disassembly or a destructive excursion. The results are shown in Figures 4-23 and 4-24.
4.3.4.6 Fission Product Release From Reentry Burnup
The release of fission products during reentry will result in a widespread dispersal of
activity within the hemisphere in which the release took place with little effect due to
gravitational settling. This is based on the assumption that all the fission products are
reduced in size to the respirable size range (< 10 microns) through vaporization and
breakup due to hypersonic reentry conditions. The Total Integrated Concentration (TIC)
at sea level (assumed to be uniformily distributed within the troposphere) will be a function
of the altitude at which the fission products are injected into the atmosphere. Figures
90 1314-25 and 4-26 indicate the variation of TIC and inhalation dose for a Sr and I release
to the stratosphere or mesophere. As would be expected, fuel releases to the stratosphere
(region below mesosphere) initially results in higher values of TIC and inhalation dose with
131time. For the short-lived I (8-day half-life), this difference persists with time after
90
release (Figure 4-26). For the long lived Sr (28-year half-life), the stratospheric and
mesospheric values converge after about 20 years (Figure 4-25). The TIC and lung dose
182from a Ta activation product release to the stratosphere and mesosphere are shown
in Figure 4-27. The releases considered in Figures 4-25, 4-26 and 4-27 are me maxi-
mum values for five years operation at 330 kWt with zero shutdown time.
4.3.4.7 Exposure From Impacted Bare Core
A reactor impacting land may possibly survive intact,but the shielding may be demolished.
The one-year integrated dose for a bare core for all reentry cases for the disposal phase
are indicated in Figures 4-28 and 4-29. Again, the reactor operating history prior to
4-30
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Figure 4-27. Sea Level Total Integrated Concentration and Lung Dose
1 Q9From Mesospheric and Stratospheric Release of Ta
reentry was taken as five years at a 330 kWt power level. The one-year integrated bare
core dose at 100 meters is indicated in Figure 4-30 as a function of shutdown time.
4.3.4.8 Exposure From Single Fuel Elements
Individuals may also be exposed to single fuel elements. The one-year integrated doses from
a single fuel element are shown in Figures 4-31 and 4-32. At 10 meters from a single fuel
element, the one-year integrated dose is presented in Figure 4-33 as a function of orbital
decay time.
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SECTION 5
RADIOLOGICAL RISK ANALYSIS
The "Risk" defined in terms of the average number of people anticipated to be exposed to
guideline values and above has been determined for all accident situations, for each mis-
sion phase and for the entire mission. Design and operations safeguards should be con-
centrated in the high risk areas to most effectively increase the safety of the mission.
5.1 CALCULATION OF ACCIDENT RISK
For each fission product release or radiation exposure, the risk to the general public
was determined. The risk was assessed through the use of an exposure index which is
defined as the average number of people who may be exposed to the dose guideline values
defined in Paragraph 2. 2. 2.1.
The exposure Index (El) is mathematically defined as:
El = E P N (5-1)
where:
N = number of people exposed to dose guideline values.
P = probability of people being exposed to dose guideline values.
The summation was made over all identified exposure modes for all accidents in the en-
tire mission. Results are presented in Section 5. 2.
5.1.1 CALCULATION TECHNIQUE
The logic for calculation of accident radiological risk is shown in Figure 5-1. As an example
of calculation technique, an accident in the Orbital Operations Phase is selected. Case 3. 3
(see Table B-3 in Appendix B) involves an equipment failure on board the Space Base which
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eliminates the possibility of reactor disposal and therefore, the power module reenters
with the damaged and abandoned Space Base 3. 5 years after shutdown. The end result in
an impact of the reactor on land, a potential excursion and disassembly followed by a re-
lease of fission products. The radiological consequences resulting from the accident are
shown in Figure 4-21 and include the organ dose as a function of distance from the reactor
impact under Pasquill F weather conditions for:
1. Inhalation Exposure Mode
90
a. Sr bone dose
131b. I thyroid dose
2. Direct Exposure Mode
a. Cloud fission products dose
b. Prompt neutron and gamma dose
c. Distributed fuel - 1 year integrated dose
These radiological consequences are the input for Boxes 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Figure 5-1.
Dose values are inserted into the calculational program for incremental distances from
zero up to tens of thousands of meters.
The dose ^ guideline values from Section 2, Table 2-2 are used in Box 6. For each exposure
shown in Boxes 1-4, the distance where the dose guideline value (Box 6) is exceeded is de-
termined (Box 7). The internal body dose from the ingestion of contaminated food/drink
and the exposure probability (Box 5) are determined. The internal body dose (Box 5) is
compared to the values in Box 6 to determine if the dose guideline value is exceeded. Pop-
ulation density is now obtained (Box 8). For Case 3. 3, the random earth impact data
assumed is shown in Table A-3 of Appendix A. The isopleth area as a function of distance
for Pasquill F weather (Box 9) is determined from data presented in Appendix A of Refer-
ence 5-1. The isopleth areas for direct exposures from prompt neutron and gamma radi-
ation and from distributed fuel are circular. Isopleth areas of inhalation exposures take on
the customary elliptical shapes which are dependent on weather conditions and release
5-3
heights. Knowing the dose guidelines values (Box 6), the isopleth area (Box 9), the popu-
lation density (Box 8), the distance where dose guideline values are exceeded for the in-
halation and direct exposure modes (Box 7), and the internal body dose and exposure proba-
bility for ingestion of contaminated food/drink (Box 5), the average number of people ex-
posed (N), if the accident occurred, is determined (Box 11).
The probability of the accident and a destructive excursion resulting in Case 3. 3 is obtained
from the probability tables in the AMD (Table 5-2 in Vol III, Part 2). The cumulative pro-
—8bability of such an accident followed by an excursion is 10 . This value is the input for
Box 10 and is the P-value in equation 5-1. The product of N (Box 9) and P (Box 10) is the
Exposure Index (El) for each exposure mode of Case 3. 3 expressed in terms of the number
of people exposed to or above the guideline value per mission (Box 11). The El for the
accident is the summation of the PxN products for all exposures resulting from the accident.
The total mission risk is the summation of each exposure index.
5.2 SUMMARY OF RISK CALCULATIONS
A summary of the risk calculations for each mission phase is presented in Table 5-1.
The highest risk accidents can be identified from the table. As shown, the total risk for
_g
the entire mission is calculated to be low (3. 9 x 10 ), where only approximately four
people are assumed to be exposed to or above dose guideline values for every 1000 missions
performed.
The Reactor Disposal Phase is the highest risk with two events being predominant:
_q
1. A reactor disposal system failure prior to circularization (El = 2. 04 x 10 ).
2. The random return from the 990 km disposal orbit (El = 1.4 x 10~3).
The incorporation of a permanent shutdown device would eliminate the excursion hazard
and significantly reduce overall risk.
A reactor recovery by the Shuttle should be considered. Shuttle recovery has been calcu-
lated to provide over a 2 order of magnitude reduction in risk during the Disposal Phase.
5-4
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Table 5-1. Summary of Risk Calcvilations
Mission Event
I Prelaunch
Reactor/LV
Integration
Transportation
to Pad
Launch
Preparations
Prelaunch
Operations
Launch/Ascent
Launch
SIC Boost
SIC Boost
S II Boost
S II Boost
Rendezvous
and Docking
Rendezvous
and Docking
Rendezvous
and Docking
Rendezvous
and Docking
Orbital Operations
Exposure
Accident Index
Reactor dropped while being mated to launch vehicle 0
Tip over of the reactor/launch vehicle during transport to the 0
launch pad
Explosion and fire on the launch pad during launch vehicle 0
fueling
Liquid metal fire 0
Phase Total 0
Laund pad abort, explosion and fire 0
Aborl^ explosion and fire (at altitude) 0
Abort, no explosion and fire (at altitude) 0
— fiAbort, explosion and fire (at altitude) 4. 9 x 10
-5Abort, no explosion and fire (at altitude) 4. 9 x 10
ft
Accidental collision while attempting to dock 2.0 x 10
(repair not possible)
-6Failure to dock with Space Base 2 .0x10
(repair not possible)
/»
Failure to remove thermal shroud 2. 0 x 10
(repair not possible)
— RFailure to rendezvous with Space Base 2. 0 x 10
Phase Total 6. 19 x 10
Equipment failure aboard Space Base necessitating early 2. 22 x 10
abandonment
- OAccidental collision or explosion in orbit necessitating early 2. 42 x 10
abandonment of Space Base
Accidental collision or explosion in orbit (Power module damaged) 5. 14 x 10~
Reactor control system malfunction or reactor operational 1.4x10
procedure error
Phase Total 7. 50 x 10~
Mission Event
File actor Disposal
Pre-separataon
Separation,
Stabilization and
Alignment
Transfer
Burn
1
Coast to Apogee,
Stabilization and
Realignment
Circularization
Burn
I
Exposure
Accident Index
— fiG&C equipment failure detected during pre-separation, G&C 2. 04 x 10
checkout and failure to repair
_7
Failure to separate power module from Space Base 2. 04 x 10
-4G&C disposal system equipment failure detected during post- 2. 04 x 10
separation stabilization and alignment and failure to repair
••fi
Misaligned thrust vector, normal 2-rocket burn 2. 22 x 10
—8Misaligned thrust vector, 1-rocket burn 2. 04 x 10
_7
Complete failure of the primary propulsion system and failure 2. 04 x 10
to repair
_9
Accidental collision with Space Base or related systems following 2.24 x 10
successful ignition of the primary propulsion system
Collision with Space Base or related systems and separation of 1. 36 x 10
the reactor/shield configuration from the power module (resulting
from the collision) following successful ignition of the primary
propulsion system
_3
G&C disposal system equipment failure detected following success- 2. 04 x 10
ful transfer burn and failure to repair
-•fiG&C equipment failure detected following a 1 rocket transfer burn 2. 22 x 10
and failure to repair.
-4One rocket failure during Circularization burn following a 1. 15 x 10
successful transfer burn
Complete failure of the primary propulsion system for the 2. 04 x 10
Circularization burn following a successful transfer burn
—8Misaligned thrust vector following ignition of 2 rockets for the 1. 52 x 10
Circularization burn (successful transfer burn)
_g
Misaligned thrust vector following ignition of 1 rocket for 6. 43 x 10
the circulanzation burn (successful transfer burn)
_7
Failure of 1 rocket during circulanzation burn following a 1 4. 66 x 10
rocket transfer burn
_g
Complete failure of the primary propulsion system for the 2. 22 x 10
circulanzation burn following a 1 rocket transfer burn
—9Misaligned thrust vector following a successful ignition of the 6. 43 x 10
primary propulsion system for the circulanzation burn following a
1 rocket transfer burn
Mission Event Accident
Circularization Misaligned thrust vector following 1 rocket failure at the
Burn (Cont) circulanzation burn (following a 1 rocket transfer burn)
1 Successful ignition of both rockets for the circulanzation bunfollowing a 1 rocket transfer burn
End-of- Random return from 990 km disposal orbit
Mission/
Reentry
Phase Total
Exposure
' Mission Phase Index
T O T A L S
Prelauncn 0
-5Launch/Ascent 6. 2 x 10
-5Orbital Operations 7. 5 x 10
_3
Reactor Disposal 3. 9 x 10
_2
Total Mission *3. 9 x 10
*3. 9 people exposed to or above dose guideline values for
every 1000 missions performed.
Exposure
Index
2.0 x 10~10
1.15x 10~
1.4x 10~3
3.86X 10~3
5-9/6 .1
A graphical comparison of phase and mission risk is shown in Figure 5-2. The expected
risk reductions due to the incorporation of a permanent shutdown device and Shuttle re-
covery are shown. As noted on the log scale graph, the single highest risk accident for
the Disposal Phase constitutes a major portion of the risk.
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Figure 5-2. Risk Analysis Summary
The highest risk accidents in each phase are individually examined in the following Subsection.
5.3 ACCIDENT EVALUATION
This section defines the most hazardous accidents which may occur in each of the mission
phases. The most hazardous accident is defined as the accident with the highest exposure
index.
5. 3. 1 PHASE 1 - PRELAUNCH
The highest probability accident is shown in Figure 5-3. During the Prelaunch Phase, there
is no apparent risk to the general public since the radiological consequences of any accident
5-7
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are confined within the KSC boundary. There also is no risk to the ground crew or spec-
tators of the launch from a pad abort, since dose guideline values will not be exceeded at the
normal vantage points. Should an accident occur during assembly or checkout, some members
of the ground crew may become exposed. However, the administrative procedures, handling
equipment and shipping containers used during the Prelaunch Phase should prevent or
definitely minimize the release of fission products or activated material in most if not all
credible accident situations.
5. 3. 2 PHASE 2 - LAUNCH/ASCENT
During the Launch/Ascent Phase, the highest risk with an exposure index of 4. 9 x 10
results from a reactor land impact in Eurasia (see Figure 5-4). This accident may occur
during the launch trajectory which passes over Eurasia from one of the following initiating
events:
1. Premature S-II thrust termination
2. Guidance and control failure
3. Launch vehicle structural failure
On land impact, the 4. 9 x 10 exposure index results from a destructive excursion due to
control drum rotation/core compaction. This particular accident could be minimized and
possibly eliminated by a control drum lockout device which is not removed until after the
reactors have been successfully docked and deployed on the Space Base. The remainder
of the risk for this phase results from overmoderation accidents where the reactor is
immersed in water.
5. 3. 3 PHASE 3 - ORBITAL OPERATIONS
During the Orbital Operations Phase, two accidents which constitute the highest risk are:
1. Accidental explosion or collision in orbit (5.1 x 10 )
2. Equipment failure aboard Space Base necessitating early abandonment (2. 2 x 10~ )
5-9
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The first accident involves an explosion or accidental collision in orbit (Figure 5-5). The
consequence of concern from an accident of this type is possible permanent damage to the
disposal system precluding early disposal of the damaged power module. Successful separ-
ation from the Space Base results in a 5-year orbital lifetime whereas remaining with an
inoperative base will provide a reduced orbital lifetime of approximately 3. 5 years.
The power module can be damaged to such an extent that the fuel cladding is breached due
to loss of cooling or the loss of reactor control. The loss of hydrogen from the core would
prevent a reactor excursion on land impact. However, land impact may result in disassembly
due to high velocity impact. Due to the high fission product inventory in the core (orbital
-5lifetime of 5 years), the resulting risk is 4. 2 x 10 people exposed to dose guidelines or
above per mission. The risk could be minimized by improving the impact resistance of the
core pressure vessel and shielding. An in-orbit recovery by the Shuttle would substantially
reduce the hazard.
The possible causes of Accident 2 may be loss of guidance and control, or loss of the environ-
mental control system of the Space Base which would cause an early abandonment. Success-
ful separation of the reactor power modules were achieved in this case which permitted an
orbital lifetime of 5 years. The failure aboard the Space Base was assumed to preclude suc-
cessful high altitude disposal. The risk results from a reactor disassembly on impact with-
out an excursion. A reduction in risk can be achieved by providing increased impact integrity,
tracking capability on reentry, and possible backup disposal control from the ground. Shuttle
recovery should also be considered; however, the power module maybe in a free flying
tumbling mode.
5. 3. 4 PHASE 4 - REACTOR DISPOSAL
During the Reactor Disposal Phase, the highest risk accident has an exposure index of
_g
2. 0 x 10 which is also the highest single risk for the entire mission. The accident that
is of concern is a disposal system guidance and control failure following the transfer burn
to the intermediate disposal orbit (Figure 5-6). As a consequence, the power module will
reenter from an elliptical orbit with a lifetime of 21 years. The risk is associated with a
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land impact disassembly caused by the high velocity impact loads. Although the core fis-
sion product activity will experience substantial decay before land impact and disassembly,
—3
the probability of the accident is high (3. 9x10 ); the overall result being a high risk value.
The radiological consequence of this accident again can be minimized by improving the
impact capability of the reactor and shield and by providing a tracking device for early
detection.
Another event worthy of mention is the risk involved in the successful disposal to the desired
orbit altitude of 990 km (535 nm) with a calculated power module lifetime of 1167 years. At
the end of this lifetime the fission products and activation products will have decayed to non-
hazardous levels. However, this does not preclude a hazard from a land impact initiated
excursion. If the fuel elements retain the hydrogen moderator during the orbital lifetime a
destruction excursion could occur on land impact due to control drum rotation/core com-
paction. Although a destructive excursion with a very low core activity inventory will
affect a relatively small area, the probability of occurrence is high, since the reactor must
impact earth after 1167 years. Hence, the resulting exposure index is 1.4 x 10 . This
risk can be reduced substantially by a permanent shutdown of the reactor prior to insertion
into the disposal orbit. The permanent shutdown method can be a combination of control
drum lockout devices and neutron poison insertion into the core. Again, a recovery by the
Shuttle rather than a boost to high earth orbit can reduce the risk and may be politically
more acceptable than eventual random reentry of a reactor power module (possibly radio-
logically non-hazardous).
5.4 REFERENCES
5-1 "Meteorology and Atomic Energy,"TID-24190, US Department of Commerce for
US Atomic Energy Commission, 1968.
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SECTION 6
PARAMETRIC RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE ANALYSIS
Parametric analyses play a key role in the terrestrial nuclear safety evaluation. Reactor
operational histories and key accident conditions are varied over a range of possible values
to illustrate the sensitivity of the resulting radiological hazard to each of the parameters.
This analysis can therefore be used to provide additional data should future power module
design and operational conditions differ from the reference mission.
The AISITE n program (Reference 6-1) is a particularly useful tool for this parametric in-
vestigation. The program automatically varies any one of forty-six parameters such as
reactor power, operating time, shutdown time, fission product release heights and release
fractions, etc. As many as ten values of the variable parameter can be calculated for each
run. Dose versus distance values for internal inhalation and external (immersion) cloud
dose to the whole body are indicated in the following figures.
Figure No. Parametric Evaluation
6-1 Effect of Weather Conditions
6-2 Effect of Release Weight
6-3 Effect of Solid Fission Product Release Function
6-4 Effect of Reactor Operating Time
6-5 Effect of Reactor Power Level
6-6 Effect of Reactor Shutdown Time
6-7 Interrelationships of Reactor Operating Time
and Reactor Shutdown Time
In addition, the internal organ doses from the ingestion of contaminated milk and water are
given in:
Figure No. Parametric Evaluation
90 1316-8 and 6-9 Ingestion Dose from Contaminated Milk (Sr , I )
6-10 and 6-11 Ingestion Dose from Contaminated Water (Sr90, I131)
6-1
One of the basic questions is how sensitive are the results to the uncertainties of the param-
eters. The results of a parametric evaluation can indicate the degree of uncertainty and the
design requirements or areas where additional research or development may be needed. In
addition to providing direction, studies of this nature provide data on the effect that design
decisions have on safety. For example, should the inclusion of a specific safeguard to re-
duce the fission product release rate result in an insignificant decrease in public safety,
the added expense is not worthwhile. Conversely, investigations of this type can indicate
which engineering safeguards are critical and to what extent. It is important to the reactor
designer to understand how design changes will affect safety.
Figure 6-1 indicates the cloud dose and the internal inhalation whole body dose as a function
of distance from the reactor for various weather conditions. The release considered is the
result of a high velocity impact disassembly. It is evident that the weather conditions pre-
vailing at the time of the accident have a significant effect on the dispersion pattern downwind
of the accident site. As an example, at a 1 km distance from the accident location there is
a factor of 100 spread in inhalation dose for the various weather conditions. For very un-
stable conditions, Pasquill A, the isopleth will be shaped like a short stubby cigar. The
downwind distance for an equivalent exposure isopleth for stable conditions, Pasquill F, will
extend much farther than that for Pasquill A. The isopleth shape will also differ in that it
will be long and thin like a Panetela cigar. To be conservative, Pasquill F parameters are
used in subsequent NSAD analyses. Figure 6-1 also shows that the inhalation dose is domi-
nant.
An increase in above ground release height significantly reduces the ground level dose to an
individual downwind of the release as seen in Figure 6-2 for a high velocity impact disassem-
bly. Because of the uncertainty of the height of the instantaneous puff release from a reactor
disassembly by either high velocity impact loads or destructive excursion, the releases are
conservatively assumed to be at ground level in the subsequent analyses.
6-2
Fission product gases and volatile iodines are assumed to be released completely in a
reactor disassembly. However, the nonvolatile solid particle fission products, such as
90 137Sr and Ca , are released to a lesser extent. Figure 6-3 indicates that the external
cloud and internal inhalation dose is directly proportional to the solid release fraction. A
fractional release of 0.05 is utilized in the NSAD.
The external cloud and internal inhalation dose is presented in Figure 6-4 as a function of
reactor operating time. As expected, the doses increase with operating time due to the
buildup of the reactor core fission product inventory. However, the integrated dose in-
creases at a slower rate as the reactor operating history increases since shorter lived
fission products have attained saturated values. At these levels, the rate of generation of
short lived fission products is balanced by the rate of decay.
The integrated dose levels for cloud and inhalation dose are directly related to reactor
power level as indicated in Figure 6-5.
The external cloud dose is primarily due to short-lived fission gases and the internal in-
halation whole body dose is primarily a consequence of long-lived fission products. There-
fore, their response to reactor cooling time differs as depicted in Figure 6-6.
The whole body inhalation dose is not greatly affected by reactor operating and cooling time
as indicated in the carpet plot in Figure 6-7. On the other hand, the whole body cloud dose
is significantly affected by reactor cooling time since this exposure mode is primarily a
consequence of short-lived fission product gases.
90 131The ingestion of milk contaminated with Sr and I has been evaluated as a function of
ingestion time and downwind distance from reactor impact location (see Figures 6-8 and
6-9) for Pasquill F weather conditions. The curves are plotted per curie of radioisotope
131
released. Since the I has a relatively short half-life (8 days) there is essentially no
90thyroid dose buildup after a 30-day ingestion period. The long-lived Sr (28-year half-life)
continues to build up after a 365-day ingestion period.
6-3
90 131The Sr and I doses from ingestion of contaminated reservoir water are shown in Fig-
ures 6-10 and 6-11 as a function of days ingested and reservoir volume. The thyroid and
90 131bone doses are given per curie Sr and I released respectively.
REFERENCES
6-1. "A Digital Computer Program for Investigation of Reactor Siting," NAA SR-9982,
AISITE H, North American Rockwell, Atomics International.
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SECTION 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The terrestrial nuclear safety analysis has shown that the overall mission risk to the general
-3public is low; it is estimated that less than 4 x 10 individuals will receive more than 25 rem
of radiation per mission (less than 4 individuals per 1000 missions performed). The imple-
mentation of additional safeguards can reduce the risk even further.
The analysis and results presented are preliminary and some of the probability and risk
values and failure modes identified apply specifically to the reference ZrH reactor and ope-
rating conditions. However, much of the analysis, conclusions and recommendations are
applicable to all space reactor powerplants. For the most part, revised probabilities, source
terms and failure modes can be factored into the analysis (abort sequence trees, etc.) to de-
termine the effect on mission risk due to changes in design or operating conditions.
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
Several of the specific conclusions resulting from the analysis are identified in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1. Conclusions
1 Low power testing of the reactor at the factory (100 watts for 12 days maximum) followed by delivery to the launch
center some 60 days hence, provides a very low radiation environment and fission product inventory during pre-
launch and launch activities.
2. There will be no radiological risk to the general public resulting from a prelaunch or launch accident at KSC since
the radioactive contamination is below specified dose guideline values (25 rem) outside the KSC boundary
3. The most significant risk is from prolonged exposure to reactor debns following land impact - generally associ-
ated with the disposal phase of the mission where fission product inventories can be high.
4. Contamination of reservoir water and pasture land can lead to an mgestion exposure problem if the supply water
or milk is not expeditiously detected and then quarantined
5. The end of mission reactor disposal phase constitutes the dominant risk The most significant reductions in risk
can be obtained by implementation of operational and design safeguards associated with this phase.
6. ZrH reactor fission product inventories are considered negligible after 100 years of decay. Disposal orbits for
the reference power module should provide a minimum 100 year lifetime.
7. The use of the Space Shuttle for reactor recovery as contrasted to a high earth orbit disposal by a disposal system
can reduce the nsk attributed to the disposal phase by approximately 2 orders of magnitude
8. Design for no excursion and the incorporation of a permanent shutdown system can provide an approximate 50 per-
cent reduction m mission risk. The risk attributed to the launch/ascent phase would be essentially zero.
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7.2 SAFEGUARDS
Nuclear Safety guidelines and requirements for the ZrH reactor power module are identified
in Volume V, Part 1. Key recommended safeguards (design and operational features) funda-
mental to the reduction of radiological risk to the general public are summarized in Table
7-2. It should be noted that these recommendations are based on a safety evaluation and do
not reflect or consider design, performance or cost trade-offs.
Table 7-2. Recommended Safeguards
1. Provide a shipping container which is designed to exclude hydrogenous media.
2. Provide positive mechanical control drum lockout devices which can be utilized up to
reactor startup and will permit partial removal for individual drum rotation checks
during p relaunch.
3. Provide a positive method of determining control drum position.
4. Provide a reactor startup command initiation sequence and control system which pre-
cludes accidental execution.
5. Provide a rapid control drum set-back capability (i. e., SCRAM) for the reactor which is
also operable in loss of power situations.
6. Provide a means of safing and recovering a reactor which is or has undergone quasi-
steady state operation.
7. Provide for a positive and permanent shutdown (no excursion) capability at the end of
mission.
8. Provide a reactor reentry and impact protection system capable of performing effectively
after 5 years in a high radiation, high temperature, vacuum environment.
9. Provide reactor tracking and locating capability to enhance impact determination and dis-
persal of recovery and safing teams.
10. Provide a reliable disposal or recovery system capable of accommodating contingency
situations. Random reentry should not be permitted.
11. Consider use of the Space Shuttle as a prime or secondary means of reactor recovery.
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7.3 AREAS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION
Many of the assumptions made, failure modes identified, source terms calculated and proba-
bilities assigned in this preliminary study are based on preliminary design, experimental
data and engineering judgement.
The analysis has identified areas where additional study and experimentation are required
prior to the conduct of a more detailed safety analysis, and the development of flight hard-
ware and definitive mission plans. Key areas requiring additional investigation are included
in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3. Areas Requiring Further Investigation
1. The adequacy of the LiH shield to function as a reentry protection shield and crush up
structure has yet to be proven. A thorough assessment of the reentry behavior after
several years in a high temperature, vacuum and radiation environment is required
to determine the necessity for a separate reentry protection system. The conclusions
of this investigation may have a significant bearing on future design concepts.
2. Experimental tests should be conducted to determine the response of a reactor to
various accidents/events such as a launch vehicle fireball (i. e., the potential total
energy release associated with a destructive excursion).
3. Experimental tests should be conducted to determine the mechanisms and energy
level associated with reactor quasi-steady state operation. Tests should be con-
ducted to quantitatively measure the rate of water introduction into the core under
different accident conditions.
4. Improvement and development of models for the determination of radiation doses
associated with the ingestion of contaminated food and water is required.
5. Refinement of probabilities associated with reactor responses, boost, disposal and
recovery vehicles is required.
6. An evaluation should be made of the use of and limits established for the dose guide-
line radiological risk technique including methods of standardization.
7. The desirability of the high earth orbit disposal of nuclear hardware should be
evaluated where eventual random reentry with negligible radiological risk is a
planned result.
8. Launch vehicle blast and fragmentation data should be refined.
9. Inadvertent control drum rotation prior to and after reactor operation may be pre-
vented by the use of mechanical interlocks. The provision of mechanical interlocks
in the reactor control drum design should receive more emphasis.
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APPENDIX A
RADIOLOGICAL E X P O S U R E MODELS
A.I. HIGH ALTITUDE RELEASE
A reactor disassembly during reentry may result in the release of gaseous and volatile
fission products and the production of small particles composed of nonvolatile fission pro-
ducts and activated materials. The small particles released are formed under hypersonic
reentry conditions through vaporization and shattering. Small particles are defined as those
with terminal velocities less than about 0. 03 m/sec. Actual particle size distributions
may be quite variable, but as long as all the particles are small ( < 10 microns), there
will be little direct influence of size on their resulting atmospheric distribution.
It is assumed that particulate materials released to the upper atmosphere (mesosphere or
stratosphere) will be dispersed solely by atmospheric motions with little effect due to
gravitational settling.
Data obtained from nuclear tests indicate that residence half-times in the mesosphere and
stratosphere are five years and two years, respectively. Material which enters the tropo-
sphere is subject to more rapid removal because of rainout and direct deposition. The
tropospheric residence half-time is approximately six days. The estimated regional
boundaries, air masses and small particle elimination constants are given in Table A-l.
Table A-l. Atmospheric Regional Boundaries, Masses, and Small
Particle Elimination Constants
Region
Mesosphere
Stratosphere
Troposphere
Altitude Boundaries
(m)
Above 4. 5 x 104
1 xlO4 to 4. 5 x 10
40 to 1 x 10
Air Mass
(kg)
1.5 x 1016
1 81.41 x 10
3.74x 1018
Elimination Constant
(years"1)
A -0. 1386
X = 0. 3465
X3 =42.15
A-l
The total integrated concentration on the troposphere for a mesospheric release is
(Reference A-l)-
TIC = 1. 031 x 10~U XX Q I 1"e
41 O | (Ao A '
o
-(X i+X)t
1-e
-(x2+x)t
1-e
(X2-X1)
(A-l)
and for a stratospheric release the expression is:
TIC = l. 031 x 10-11
-(x2+x)t
1-e
-(X +X)t I
1-e 3
-
(W(VX) (W (X3"4A) -
(A-2)
where:
TIC
Q
X,
X
t
(
= total integrated concentration, Ci-sec/m*
= curies released
= mesospheric elimination constant, year
= stratospheric elimination constant, year
= tropospheric elimination constant, year
= radioactive decay constant, year
= time since activity release, year
-1
-1
A. 2. INHALATION OF AIRBORNE FISSION PRODUCTS
The transport and subsequent diffusion of a cloud of released fission products is determined
by Pasquill diffusion parameters. The equation derived for radioisotope inhalations is
(Reference A-2):
A-2
_ 0.168RQT - -^ — j
T ~ M de ( d ) h ( d ) e (A 3)
where:
A = amount of radioisotope inhaled from cloud during exposure for
T seconds, curies
Q = radioisotope released to the air up to time T , curies
H - effective release height
d = downwind distance, m
M = windspeed, m/sec
h(d)= vertical cloud spread at distance d, meters
9 (d)= lateral cloud spread at distance d, degrees
3
R = breathing rate, m /sec
The plume concentration distribution (vertical and angular cloud spread) can be defined
in terms of their standard deviations (Reference A-3):
h (d) - 2.14 cr (A-4)
z
4.280
6 (d) = — l (A-5)
A.
The values of h(d) and 6 (d) are obtained from the above relationships where the lateral and
vertical diffusion standard deviations are obtained from Figures A-l and A-2. Type F
stable dispersion (inversion case) has been used in the analyses since this meteorological
condition results in conservative estimates of the inhalation hazard. The values of vertical
and angular cloud spread for Type F used in the analyses are shown in Table A-2.
A-3
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Table A-2. Pasquill Type F Meteorological Data
Downwind
Distance,
d -meters
1
10
100
200
500
1,000
5,000
15,000
25,000
50, 000
Vertical Cloud
Spread, h(d)-
meters
0. 0492
0.492
4.92
7.8
17.0
29.0
73.8
112.6
151.4
248.4
Lateral Cloud
Spread, 9(d)-
Degrees (radians)
11.0
11.0
11.0
10.7
10.0
9.38
7.52
6.40
5.28
2.48
The calculation takes into account the radioactive decay of the radioisotopes during transit
downwind. The breathing rate utilized was 3. 47 x 10 m /sec.
A. 3. ORGAN DOSE RESULTING FROM SINGLE INHALATION
The isotope inhalation dose by an organ for infinite residence time is given by (Reference A-4):
D = 8. 54 x 10
2 AT fa E Te
m
(A-6)
where
a
E
Te
m
is given by equation (A-3), curies
= fraction of the amount inhaled which is deposited in the critical organ
= effective energy absorbed by the critical organ per disintegration, Mev
= effective half-life for the isotope in the body, sec
= mass of the critical organ, g
A-5
A. 4 IMMERSION DOSE FROM THE CLOUD
The direct dose to the whole body from immersion in a cloud considers only gammas and
assumes a semi-infinite cloud. The direct dose from the cloud at a distance, d, from an
exposure interval,T , is determined by summing the gamma dose received from each iso-
tope in the cloud as follows:
D cloud(d) - 0. 246 £ *- , rads (A-7)
K
1 T
where
A (d) is given by equation (A-3), curies
E = gamma energy for isotope i, Mev
3
R = breathing rate, m /sec
This formulation is from References A-2 and A-5. The model overestimates the direct
dose from the cloud for ground release because it is assumed that the cloud is semi-infinite
and uses the centerline isotope concentration.
A. 5 INGESTION DOSE TO MAN FROM IODINE-131
The relationship between the integrated air concentration in milk can be expressed by the
following equation (Reference A-6):
(TIC)V Fi Fm Md
CM = —&- , Curies/liter (A-8)
r V
w m
A-6
where
3
TIC = total integrated concentration, Ci-sec/m
V = deposition velocity, m/sec
6
Fi = amount of feed consumed by the cow, g/day
Fm = fraction of iodine getting into milk
Md = density of milk , g/1
2
Fw = vegetation to area factor , g/m
Vm = daily volume of milk produced by a cow, 1
-2CM = 8 x 10 TIC , Ci/liter of I in milk
It was assumed that the time from deposition on the pasture until the milk concentration is
131
at a maximum is about 2 days. With this decay, the dominant radioiodine is I . The
131dose to the thyroid from I ingestion is given by:
_. *-f J.TJ. y J. J.^- j T J- .L \s VX \-*. \*r J i .m*tj JCM(TIC) V F
X eff
1 -e
XL
 r
1
 e 2 (1 -e bl)
where
CM(TIC) = milk concentration, Ci/1
V - milk consumption, I/day
X eff = effective decay constant = X + X , days
X = radioactive decay constant, days
X, - biological decay constant, days
t = days of ingestion
t = dose integration time, days
A-7
A. 6 INGESTION OF CONTAMINATED DRINKING WATER
The impact of a reactor into a potable water supply has been evaluated. If it were assumed
that the fission products released to a reservoir were rapidly dispersed in the entire vol-
ume, the dose from ingestion of the contaminated water is given by (Reference A-7):
where
where
Cfw S V
0
X
r -(x + x ) t,
r res 11-e
(X +X )
r res
-Xt / (Xb -Xres)t \-2 1 i 1 /
+ e \ 1-e /
(Xb - Xres)
D = bone dose received in time, t , ingestion over period, t , remi ^ 1
90Cfw = rem/day to the bone due to 1 jnci of Sr taken in at time, t = 0
S = initial equilibrium reservoir concentration, Q /Vres
Q = n Curies released
V = reservoir volume, m
res
X = radiological decay constant, day
r
X, = biological decay constant, day
_i
X = effective decay constant, day
X = reservoir turnover, day
res
_ _, .. 3.7xl04x 1. 6xlO~ 6x 8.64xl04f0 e
f R Rm/day = 2
q yd ~ 100m
4
3.7x10 = dis/sec-fzci
— fi1.6x10 = ergs/Mev
4
8. 64 x 10 = sec/day
A-8
100 = ergs/g rad
H = rem/day
q = body burden,
f? = fraction of body burden in organ of reference
e = effective absorbed energy per disintegration- £ EF(RBE)n
m = mass of organ of reference, g
For some representative radioisotopes the values for Cfw in rem/day - pci are:
90 —^Sr 3. 62 x 10
89 -3Sr 4. 39 x 10
1131 1.76X10-1
1132 4. 99 x 10"1
1133 4.15X10-1
1134 6.30X101
1135 3 .98xlO~2
H3 7.31xlO~6
A. 7 POPULATION DENSITY DISTRIBUTION
In evaluating the risk to the general public from potential Space Base accidents, the popu-
lation density distribution is associated with random reentry and earth impact. Refer-
ence A-8 presents the composite population distribution data for the entire world's surface
as well as the surface contained between 35 degrees S and 35 degrees N latitude. This data
was primarily obtained from the Defense Communication Agency of the DOD.
A-9
The data used for the Space Base study was for the entire world's surface since this was
considered more representative of the 55 degrees S and 55 degrees N latitude area which
is of concern for an orbit with an inclination of 55 degrees to the equatorial plane of the
earth.
The population density distribution for the 90 degrees S to 90 degrees N latitude case is
shown in Table A-3.
Table A-3. Population Density Distribution Data
for 90 Degrees S to 90 Degrees N Latitude
Population Density
2
People Ani
0
0.39
1.93
9.65
38.6
193
386
772
1,158
1,544
1,931
2,703
3, 861
5,792
7,722
9, 653
19,310
28,960
38,610
48, 260
57,920
65, 640
> 77,220
0.39
1.93
9.65
38.6
193
386
772
1,158
1,544
1,931
2,703
3,861
5,792
7,722
9,653
19,310
28, 960
38,610
48, 260
57, 920
65, 640
77,220
Fraction of Earth's Surface
with Density Within
Boundary of Interval
i
1.92 xlO
-11.78x 10
-1
1. 45 x 10
-2
7. 5 x 10
2
3. 2 x 10
-3
5.8x10
-3
1.69 x 10
-44. 8 x 10
-43. 6x 10
-43.1 x 10
-42. 6x 10
-42.1 x 10
-41.29 x 10
-56. 5 x 10
-5
4. 0 x 10
-5
2. 6x 10
-66.2x10
-61.27 x 10
-7
3. Ox 10
-7
1.24x 10
-83. 4x 10
-81.95 x 10
-81.1 x 10
A-10
During the Launch/Ascent Phase, the Space Base mission requires insertion of the payload
into a 500 km (273 nm) circular orbit inclined 55 degrees to the earth equatorial plane.
The trajectory for this flight takes the payload over Eurasia. Table A-4 indicates the
population density distribution for Eurasia (Reference A-9) for a 185 km (100 nm) wide
track along the reference mission instantaneous impact points.
Table A-4. Population Density Distribution Data, for Eurasia
Population
People/
0
0.39 -
1.93 -
9.65
38.6
193
386
772
1,158
1,544
1,931
2,703
3, 861
Density
Ton
0.39
1.93
9.65
38.6
193
386
772
1,158
1,544
1,931
2,703
3,861
5,792
Fraction of Eurasian Surface
with Density Within
Boundary of Interval
3. 90 x 10"
2. 54 x 10~
-
3. 69 x 10~2
2. 78 x 10"1
3.93 x 10~2
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.2 x 10"3
A. 8.
* Includes Eurasian water with population density of ~ 0 people/km^
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CONVERSION FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temoerature
International
Units English Units
m/sec ft/sec
m2 ft2
in2
Kg/m2 lb/ft3
lb/m3
Joule Btu
Newton Ibf
m ft
nm
Kg Ibm
watt Btu/ sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Newton/m2 Atmosphere
lbf/m2
lbf/ft2
m/sec ft/sec (fps)
K F
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
3.281
10.764
1550.39
6.242 x 10~2
3.610 x 10~5
9.479 x 10"4
2.248X 10'1
3.281
5.399X 10~4
2.205
9.488X 10"4
5.691 x 10~2
3.413
3.413
1.451 X 10"4
2.088 x 10~2
3.281
(9/5 -459.67/tK)
Volume
ft2
6.097 x 104
35.335
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Critlcality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probability
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed Material
Dose Guidelines
Dosimetry
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or imminent
degradation or failure of hardware. (In the safety analysis, no distinction is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which may or may not result from a system failure or mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and particulars released to the air
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
Internal pressures
Radiation causing atomic displacement in semiconductor devices - sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage
A condition where a radioactive material is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor. (As used in safety analysis results in a reactor excursion )
The act of increasing the density of the core which results in increased reactivity and possible
criticality
A gas blanket used to provide an inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations.
—12An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurence of > 10~
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain criticality
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of "relative probabilities" of the individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree).
Same as "Breached"
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc (e g , washing, filtering, chipping).
An excursion (safety analysis assumes ~ 100 MW-sec) accompanied by a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
participates
Nuclear hardware (e g , reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a critical mass
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware
The spread of nuclear fuel and radioactive debris on the earth's surface following impact or
destructive excursion
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety analysis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation
II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion
Exposure Limit
Fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burial
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard source
Immediate Reentry
Impact in Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
Impact in Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
Intact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
Interfacing Vehicle
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment signal-to-noise ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System
Generally associated with the termination of the mission or flight Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after intended lifetime
A rapid and usually unplanned increase in thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula
tcry agencies or limits which preclude equipment damage
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nuclide such
as U-235 or Pu-239
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioisotopes in a heat source used in producing energy
A shaped body of nuclear fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result in harm or
damage to personnel and equipment
The location and/or origin of the hazard
Very early reentry of the reactor (e g , misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting in 1-2 day reentry)
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material on the Continental Shelf or in a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an interaction
with the Manned Space Base
III
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lonization Damage
Land Impact
Loss of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non-credible
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Poison
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-poison
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological Consequences
Radiological Hazards
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
Radiation causing surface damage in materials (e g., the fogging of film)
Nuclear hardware which impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early in the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases
Material used in a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron capture Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors in a thermal reactor
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid.
Represents no hazard to the general populace
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurrence of < 10
not worthy of concern
-12 Considered
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events
Immersion of reactor in an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor criticality under all foreseeable circumstances.
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a realtor
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude
A poison which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reacticity Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison".
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with the fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay Commonly associated with an excursion event
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub-
critical due to water surging in and out of the core
The radiation exposure effect on personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event
Hazards associated with radiation as differentiated from other sources
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
in a given mission or phase thereof
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super-critical and negative values to reactors which are sub-critical (Usually ex-
pressed in multiples of a dollar )
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Reactor Fails to Survive Reentry
Reactor Survives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative Probability
Repair/Replacement
Ruptured
Safety
Safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating, radiation shield may be damaged
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield.
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices.
Consists of (a) physically repairing all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s)
Same as "Breached".
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property
Conditlon(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple injuries to personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any injury to
personnel (SPD-1A)
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury (SPD-1A)
A separate, possibly automatic, mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program.
All aspects of the Space Base mission including all prime and support hardware and personnel
both on the ground, at sea or in orbit, which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space, these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first
stage thrust
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode
Material in which isotopes of an element may be incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical, biological or physical process '
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